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John B. Carlson, Joseph G. Haubrich, and John Lindner
The Federal Reserve balance sheet’s size and composition have changed dramatically since September 2008. Federal 
Reserve policymakers have expressed their support for eventually shrinking the Fed’s balance sheet and returning the 
composition of its securities portfolio to include only U.S. Treasury issues. Through the careful study of public Federal 
Open Market Committee documents, this Economic Commentary concisely explains some of the FOMC’s decisions 
concerning an appropriate sequence of policy actions..
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Figure 1. The Federal Reserve Balance Sheet
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Monetary policy over the past three years has been a non-
stop stream of nimble responses to unprecedented challenges. 
The traditional interest rate target framework for imple-
menting monetary policy has evolved into a “credit-easing” 
approach in response to the ﬁ  nancial crisis. This new ap-
proach focuses on the mix of loans and securities the Federal 
Reserve holds and how the mix of these assets affects credit 
conditions for households and businesses. 
One implication of the new approach is that the stance of 
monetary policy can no longer be easily summarized by a 
target for the federal funds rate. The Fed’s balance sheet has 
become a crucial tool of monetary policy. This Economic Com-
mentary explains recent policy actions in terms of changes in 
the size and composition of the balance sheet and also draws 
out the likely sequencing of actions based on careful study 
of the FOMC meeting minutes. Under current policy, the 
Fed’s balance sheet is set to diminish slowly (wither). What 
path it will take going forward (whither), however, will de-
pend on the evolution of economic and ﬁ  nancial conditions.
Early Stages of Credit Easing
When ﬁ  nancial turmoil ﬁ  rst emerged in the summer of 
2007, inﬂ  ationary pressures were a concern, and the FOMC 
was reluctant to lower the fed funds rate from its then target 
of 5¼ percent. So the initial response was to provide credit 
through the Fed’s traditional facility for banks, the Discount 
Window. But the liquidity failed to spread to nonbank 
ﬁ  nancial intermediaries, and a number of new lending 
facilities were created to provide credit to a broader array of 
ﬁ  nancial institutions and to targeted markets. In September 
2007, the FOMC also began to ease its policy stance using 
its traditional tool, lowering the fed funds rate to 2 percent 
by the end of its April 2008 meeting. In March 2008, the Fed 
invoked Section 13 (3) of the Federal Reserve Act to allow it 
to provide secured credit directly to primary dealers. During 
the ﬁ  rst year of the turmoil, the credit-easing policies affected 
the composition but not the size of the balance sheet.
This changed when Lehman Brothers ﬁ  led for bankruptcy 
in September 2008. Additional credit channels developed to 
provide credit directly to the commercial paper and money-
fund markets generated a surge in loans that more than dou-
bled the size of the balance sheet within a few weeks. Some 
of the new loans were a direct result of support provided to 
systemically important institutions, such as the loan made to 
AIG. Other new facilities channeled liquidity to the commer-
cial paper market and to money market mutual funds. The 
consequences for both the size and composition of the Fed’s 
balance sheet were dramatic, as can be seen in ﬁ  gure 1.Communication, transparency, and consistent behavior will 
be critical elements to keep inﬂ  ation expectations in check 
and minimize any potential risk posed by the extraordinary 
level of excess reserves. Discussions about the exit strategy 
are ongoing, but key perspectives are revealed in FOMC 
policy statements, published minutes of the FOMC meet-
ings, and speeches by Committee members. 
Long-Term Strategy
Published minutes of recent FOMC meetings show partici-
pants broadly support steps to reduce the size of the Fed’s 
balance sheet over time and return the composition of its 
portfolio to include only Treasury securities. The guiding 
principle is that the FOMC should minimize the extent 
to which the Fed’s portfolio affects the allocation of credit 
among private borrowers and sectors of the economy. It was 
only in the face of the extraordinary threat to the economy 
posed by the collapse in housing prices that the Committee 
chose to deviate from that principle.
The Committee also has expressed broad support for ulti-
mately returning to a fed funds rate targeting procedure or 
something quite similar. Taken together with the long-term 
strategy to return to a Treasury-security-only portfolio, the 
balance sheet would eventually appear more similar to how 
it looked like prior to 2007. Its size would again be deter-
mined by the levels of currency and reserves demanded, 
given the targeted policy rate. 
Getting to There from Here
While FOMC members share a broad consensus on the 
eventual size and composition of the balance sheet, Com-
mittee members differ on how quickly that conﬁ  guration 
can be reached. The course of policy will be determined 
by the Committee’s assessment of the sustainability of the 
economic recovery, ﬁ  nancial market conditions, and the 
resilience of the housing sector. It is clear, however, that 
when economic conditions warrant a removal of policy ac-
commodation, the Federal Reserve will have a number of 
new tools to choose from. 
One key new tool is interest on reserves. In October 2008, 
the Fed announced that it would begin to pay interest on de-
pository institutions’ required and excess reserve balances, 
having been given authority by Congress. By raising the 
interest rate on excess reserves (IOER), the Fed can increase 
the general level of short-term interest rates. In principle, 
the Fed now has the ability to remove policy accommoda-
tion without reducing the size of the balance sheet or excess 
reserves.
When ﬁ  rst introduced, it was expected that IOER would 
provide an effective ﬂ  oor to the fed funds rate, the rate at 
which banks borrow and lend reserves to each other. Banks 
with excess reserves have no incentive to lend at rates below 
the interest earned on excess reserves. Hence banks deﬁ  cient 
in reserves, it was thought, would have to pay more than 
the IOER rate to get the funds. In practice, however, the fed 
Beyond the Zero Bound 
By the time of the Lehman bankruptcy, the Fed had vastly 
depleted its arsenal of interest rate cuts as measures for 
policy stimulus. In October 2008, the FOMC lowered the 
fed funds rate to 1 percent. A further reduction in Decem-
ber essentially took the policy rate to its zero bound. 
In November 2008, prior to reaching the zero bound, the 
Federal Reserve announced a program to purchase the 
direct obligations of housing-related government-sponsored 
enterprises (GSEs)—Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the 
Federal Home Loan Banks—and mortgage-backed securities 
(MBS) backed by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie 
Mae. Never before had the Fed made purchases that 
affected the allocation of credit so directly to one sector 
of the economy on so large a scale.
When the program, called Large Scale Asset Purchases 
(LSAP), was announced, the release noted that the action 
was taken to reduce the cost and increase the availability 
of credit for the purchase of houses, which in turn should 
support housing markets and foster improved conditions in 
ﬁ  nancial markets more generally. The announcement was 
associated with an immediate reduction across an array of 
mortgage-related interest rates. In the face of a continuing 
deterioration of economic and ﬁ  nancial conditions, LSAP 
was expanded in March 2009. Purchase limits on agency 
debt and MBS were increased to a total of more than 
$1.4 trillion, and the Committee introduced an additional 
$300 billion of total purchases of long-term Treasury issues. 
A byproduct of credit-easing policies has been the increase in 
excess reserves to more than $1 trillion from around $2 bil-
lion—their average level for much of the decade prior to the 
crisis. For some members of the FOMC, the unprecedented 
level of excess reserves poses potential risks that could un-
dermine the Fed’s credibility to maintain price stability.
Removing Policy Accommodation
Maintaining credibility will ultimately depend on remov-
ing the extraordinary policy accommodation at the right 
pace and time. Some of the credit policies have unwound 
naturally as ﬁ  nancial conditions improved. Almost all of the 
special loan programs expired on February, 2010, the major-
ity of loans have been repaid with interest, and the amount 
outstanding is projected to be repaid likewise. The balance 
sheet effect of the unwinding of lending facilities, however, 
has been more than offset by the security purchases. At 
the end of March 2010, the Fed completed its last planned 
purchases. Since then it has followed a policy of redeeming 
agency debt or MBS that have matured or been prepaid. 
When principal and interest payments are made, there is an 
equal reduction in bank reserves at the payer’s bank. Thus, 
the balance sheet is set to wither, but very slowly.
Well before the recovery started, the FOMC had begun 
to prepare and develop an exit strategy for when the time 
came to remove the extraordinary policy accommodation. funds market includes some lending institutions that do not 
earn interest on reserves, such as the GSEs, and they do not 
have an alternative but to lend at a market determined rate. 
Because of the sheer magnitude of excess reserves at deposi-
tories, few depositories need to borrow fed funds. GSEs 
have limited alternatives to lending in the fed funds market 
and thus have little bargaining power—and has led the fed 
funds rate to trade below the IOER ﬂ  oor. 
Reserve Management Tools
When the credit policies were adopted, it was well under-
stood that unwinding the policy accommodation would like-
ly beneﬁ  t from having new and enhanced tools for draining 
reserves. Reserve draining tools would help to further quell 
fear that may spread from elevated levels of excess reserves, 
but unlike the aforementioned IOER management tool, 
reserve draining tools would temporarily remove reserves 
from the system. To this end, the Fed has been develop-
ing tools that would allow it to drain bank reserves quickly 
if warranted. Reducing excess reserves would also likely 
improve the FOMC’s control over short-term interest rates 
using the IOER policy tool. 
One enhanced reserve management tool involves the Fed 
selling a security from its portfolio with an agreement to 
purchase it back at a speciﬁ  ed time and price—an arrange-
ment commonly called a reverse repurchase agreement or 
reverse repo. Technically the security sold remains an asset 
on the Fed’s balance sheet and hence does not reduce the 
balance sheet’s size. But because the arrangement absorbs 
bank reserves, the reverse repo also appears as a Fed liabil-
ity. Reverse repos have been used by the Fed, often with a 
foreign ofﬁ  cial institution as the counterparty, though on a 
small scale. Since the fall of 2009, the New York Fed Trad-
ing Desk has implemented a number of changes that will 
allow for a larger scale of operations with a broader set of 
counterparties (see box). 
Another reserve management tool—the Term Deposit Ac-
count (TDA)—is similar to a certiﬁ  cate of deposit available 
at one’s local bank. It involves a commitment to lock up 
deposits for a speciﬁ  ed period of time. Depositories could 
choose to hold their deposits at the Fed in a TDA and 
earn a higher rate. TDAs would not count toward reserve 
requirements, so by choosing a TDA, banks would directly 
reduce their level of excess reserves. Similar to the case of 
reverse repos, the size of the Fed’s balance sheet would not 
be affected by an increase in TDAs. 
Sequencing
Although the balance sheet has begun to wither slowly as 
agency debt and MBS mature or are prepaid, most FOMC 
members expect asset sales will be part of the exit strategy 
at some point. Sales of agency debt and MBS would hasten 
the return to a Treasuries-only portfolio, consistent with the 
FOMC’s long-term strategy. Asset sales would also reduce the 
potential inﬂ  ationary consequences of a persistently high level 
of excess reserves. 
Current Progress in Developing Reserve-
Management Tools
The latest reports on the preparedness of the reserve 
draining tools show that positive steps have been 
taken to assure that the tools’ implementation will 
take place smoothly when the time arrives. 
Reverse repos are all but operational at this point. 
Small-scale operations have already taken place to 
make certain that the procedures and transactions 
are properly arranged, and those trades were suc-
cessful. More recently, a broader set of counterpar-
ties is being constructed to make these investment 
opportunities more widely accessible. Money market 
funds were invited to participate in mid-March 2010 
and were given their own set of eligibility require-
ments. Other possible inclusions may be GSEs or 
any other traditional sellers of funds in the money 
markets. Until all counterparties are added, only an-
nounced, small-scale operations are expected.
The basic principles for the Term Deposit Facility 
were established in a recent press release in May 
2010. Deposits are to be awarded in a single-rate 
auction setting with maturities up to 84 days. There 
will be both competitive and noncompetitive auctions 
to ensure entry for smaller institutions. Term deposits 
will not be counted toward excess reserve balances 
but may be used as collateral at the Discount Win-
dow. Small-scale operations to test the preparedness 
of the facility began in June, and more may be forth-
coming. These small-scale operations were largely 
successful and were met with very high demand. 
While the Committee has broadly agreed to eventually 
return to a more normal balance sheet, the wounds from 
the collapse in housing have been deep, and the risks from 
removing support too quickly are potentially great. Recent 
FOMC meeting minutes reveal that for the time being, 
Committee members agreed to redeem agency debt and 
MBS prepayments but to roll over all maturing Treasury se-
curities. The FOMC has also broadly agreed that asset sales 
would not begin for some time. Sales would be implemented 
in accordance with a framework communicated in advance 
and be conducted initially at a gradual pace that could be 
adjusted in response to changes in economic and ﬁ  nancial 
conditions.
However, because the Fed has developed other tools for re-
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at which the balance sheet will return to its normal conﬁ  gu-
ration will depend on the sequence of policy actions. That 
sequence will largely be determined by the perceptions of 
FOMC participants about the likely evolution of economic 
and ﬁ  nancial market conditions, and on the resilience of the 
housing sector. The stronger the economy and the stronger 
the housing sector in particular, the sooner asset sales would 
likely commence. 
Recent FOMC minutes reveal that a majority of mem-
bers do not expect asset sales to begin until after the ﬁ  rst 
increase in interest rates, and that would not occur for a 
considerable period of time. Of course, the current view on 
the sequence of policy actions hinges on inﬂ  ation remaining 
well behaved and inﬂ  ation expectations staying anchored. 
Should inﬂ  ation expectations appear to be rising, asset sales 
could be moved forward in the sequence. A concrete path 
for asset sales could serve as a clear commitment to produce 
stable inﬂ  ation and head off an inﬂ  ation scare. On the other 
hand, the sudden resumption of ﬁ  nancial turmoil in Europe 
underscores the uncertainty of any economic outlook. We 
cannot rule out a potential deﬂ  ation scare quite yet. Nor can 
we be sure that the size of the balance sheet has crested. 
To summarize, given the most recent policy actions, the 
balance sheet is on a track to decline very gradually as 
payments (both scheduled and prepayments) are made on 
the underlying mortgages held in the Fed’s portfolio. At 
some point, however, we expect the economic recovery will 
gain sufﬁ  cient momentum to be clearly self-sustained. In 
the meantime, the FOMC will monitor closely measures of 
inﬂ  ation and inﬂ  ation expectations, both for signs of rising 
inﬂ  ation or further disinﬂ  ation. If the economy accelerates 
and inﬂ  ationary pressures emerge, one might expect the 
FOMC to change its post-meeting statement language to 
prepare markets for an anticipated increase in IOER. 
It should be emphasized that any decision to initiate asset 
sales, and thus accelerate the decline of the balance sheet, 
would be implemented in accordance with a framework 
communicated in advance and be conducted initially at a 
gradual pace that could be adjusted in response to changes 
in economic and ﬁ  nancial conditions. 